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Abstract  
The purpose of this paper is to find an answer to the question: does the prohibition of non-audit services affect the 
audit quality and audit fees in Saudi Arabia. A questionnaire survey was used to pick-up opinions from a sample of 
auditors who are working at Big-4 and non Big-4 audit firms. The results suggest that preventing joint NAS and 
audit services will lead to the decrease in the number of auditors who provide audit services and hence audit fees 
would increase. Furthermore, auditors select NAS on the account of audit services due to the less effort required and 
the higher income gained. It is expected that audit services will be carried out by small audit firms of less 
experienced and unqualified staff. Demographics as auditors’ academic degree and experience have influenced the 
respondent auditors’ perceptions on some of the questions. It was found that type of audit firm has no impact on 
auditors’ perceptions, where all auditors expressed the same views on the impact of the NAS on the audit fees and 
the audit quality.  It is hope that the findings of this study would pave the way for policy setters to find out the 
mechanisms that would help in controlling audit fees and ensure a high level of audit quality in the audit market of 
Saudi Arabia.  
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1. Introduction 
In the light of the major corporate scandals at the beginning of this century, the issues of auditor fees and quality and 
the provision of non-audit services have attracted considerable attention and become the focus of much debate. 
Several countries moved swiftly to pass legislation to curtail or eliminate many auditors provided non-audit services 
and imposed compulsory auditor rotation. Such legislation has, in effect, reduced the auditor-client relationship, 
although it may potentially raise the cost to an auditor of expressing an independent opinion. As a result, questions 
have been raised about whether the regulators’ actions were justified, and whether a company should be forced to 
replace the auditor on a regular basis, or whether the auditor should be allowed to build a long-term relationship with 
the client. 
Before the recent prohibition of certain types of non-audit services, auditors could perform different types of non-
audit services for their public company clients in the U.S. It had been argued that the fees for non-audit services had 
grown substantially and were more lucrative than the fees from audit services, thus strengthening the economic bond 
and substantially increasing the threat of impaired auditor independence. A number of regulatory bodies in the U.S. 
like the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Public Oversight Board (POB) and the AICPA recently 
asserted that significant high non-audit fees can adversely affect auditor independence and impair auditor decision-
making, especially when those decisions involve a substantial amount of professional judgment. Concerns over 
auditor independence and the magnitude of non-audit services have led to the reporting of these fees for public 
companies in the U.S., beginning in 2001, although they had already been reported for many years in countries such 
as the U.K. and Australia. Given the interests and the importance of non-audit fees in terms of auditor independence, 
it is not surprising that several prior papers have examined this issue. 
According to Self-Determination Theory (SDT), rewards can be used to control the behavior of individuals as long 
as the individual expects to be rewarded and the rewards are administered in a high-pressure environment. We use 
this finding of STD to argue that when auditors are promised rewards in the form of future NAS fees, they are more 
likely to agree with the client and allow earnings management. We expect this relationship to be more salient in a 
high-pressured environment such as the period before SOX because according to anecdotal reports during this time 
many audit partners were effectively pressured by their firm’s upper management to grow the NAS business.  
In furtherance of the requirements of Section 201 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission adopted final rules prohibiting, during audit professional engagement period, both U.D. and non-U.S. 
accounting firms from providing to their audit clients that are SEC reporting companies ten specific types of non-
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audit services or any non-audit services that impairs an accountant’s independence from its audit clients. The 
prohibition of specified non-audit services is categorised into three basic principles: 
- An auditor cannot function in the role of management; 
- An auditor cannot audit its own work; and 
- An auditor cannot serve in an advocacy role for its client.  
It can be noted that an accountant’s independence would be impaired by engaging in the following prohibited non-
audit services on behalf of an audit client: 
− Bookkeeping or other services related to the audit client's accounting records or financial 
statements. 
− Financial information systems design and implementation. 
− Actuarial services. 
− Internal audit outsourcing. 
− Management functions. 
− Human resources. 
− Broker-dealer, investment adviser or investment banking services. 
− Legal services. 
− Expert services 
− Tax services 
In Saudi Arabia, providing NAS is completely prohibited, where auditors are not allowed to provide NAS to their 
client who is engaged in an audit process as declared by the Saudi Organization of Certified Public Accountants 
(SOCPA) in Article No. 5. However, while the issue of non-audit services and its impact on audit profession has 
been examined in previous western studies, they concluded with inconsistent results. However, to the best of the 
author awareness, very few studies examine the impact of the prohibition of the NAS on audit quality and audit fees 
in Saudi Arabia. It is believed that this study would supplement the academia and literature by providing answers to 
the following research questions: 
RQ1: To what extent the audit quality is affected if the auditor prohibited from renders non-audit  
           services? 
RQ2: Do preventing joint NAS and audit services would affect audit fees?           
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the background of the study and develops 
the hypotheses. The data analysis and discussion of findings are outlined section three. Conclusions and some future 
avenues for future research are presented in section four. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Recent studies on whether the provision of non-audit services impairs audit quality document mixed results, 
depending on the proxy for auditing quality used. In general, prior research suggests two opposing views with 
respect to the effect of auditor-provided NAS on audit quality. One view is that the provision of NAS could provide 
benefits for audit quality in the form of knowledge spillovers (Simunic 1984; Beck et al. 1988; Antle and Demski 
1991). Specifically, NAS constitutes an important source of information that enriches auditor’s knowledge about the 
client’s operations beyond the knowledge gained simply through the audit process (Beck and Wu 2006). The 
incremental knowledge gained from NAS enables the auditor to perform the audit more efficiently and effectively. 
This view suggests that NAS enhances audit quality.  
However, increased efficiencies due to NAS provision could be detrimental to audit quality if the auditor 
appropriates cost savings from knowledge spillovers. This occurs because the appropriation of cost savings amounts 
to higher rents associated with NAS, hence bonding the auditor economically to the client (Beck et al. 1988; Levitt 
2000). The economic bond enhances the risk that the auditor will favor a client’s financial reporting choices 
regardless of their merit in fear of losing the rents. Hence, NAS could impair an auditor’s independence, which in 
turn could negatively affect audit quality. It is primarily this perspective coupled with some anecdotal evidence that 
is used as a basis for a regulatory ban on auditor-provided NAS. For example, regulators point to the existence of 
high NAS fees paid to the auditor of Enron as the major instigator to blame for the audit failure. This casual 
observation is the premise for the banning of NAS contained within the Sarbanes Oxley of 2002. 
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Extant research has consistently failed to find any compelling evidence that establishes a direct link between auditor-
provided NAS and poor audit quality. A handful of papers show some indirect evidence that the auditor-provided 
NAS is associated with poor financial reporting quality. For example, Frankel et al. (2002) shows that firms that 
purchase a high NAS from their auditor exhibit low quality financial reporting as measured by accruals and the 
propensity to meet or beat earnings. Similarly, Hoitash et al. (2005), Francis and Ke (2006), and Srinidhi and Gul 
(2007) find evidence of a negative association between NAS and financial reporting quality or perceptions of it. 
However, the findings of Frankel et al. (2002) are disputed in a follow-up paper by Ashbaugh et al. (2003) who find 
that the results are sample specific and do not hold under various sensitivity tests. Subsequent research continued to 
document a “no-effect” result and for the most part concludes that there is no evidence that NAS impairs audit 
quality (Barkess and Simentt 1994; DeFond et al. 2002; Chaney and Philipich 2002; Raghunandan et al. 2003; 
Ruddock et al. 2006; Habib 2009). 
Eilifsen and Knivsflå (2008) examine investors’ perceptions about audit quality in the post-Enron years 2003-2006 in  
Norway. The results suggest that annual stock market returns are less responsive to reported earnings when auditors’ 
provision of non-audit services (NAS) to the reporting firms is relatively high. The negative effect on the earnings 
response coefficients is moderated if the audit is by a Big 4 firm. The adverse investor perceptions are driven by 
observations early in the period, especially 2003, a year with escalating scandals and severe criticism of the audit 
profession. The findings are consistent with the interpretation that regulatory initiatives and perhaps a refocus in the 
audit firms in the wake of the Enron scandal were instrumental in easing investors’ concerns of provision of the NAS 
to audit clients. 
Causholli et al. (2010) examine whether the prospect of future lucrative NAS contracts affects auditor judgment and 
leads to lower audit quality. They test the association between audit quality and future NAS fees for auditors that 
were under significant pressure to obtain NAS fees. The results reveal that future realized NAS fees are negatively 
related to both measures of audit quality; i.e., (1) the absolute value of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals 
and (2) earnings response on unexpected quarterly earnings. 
Research that is more recent has sought to gain a deeper understanding of the role of NAS in reporting quality by 
examining different types of NAS separately. Prior research suggests that because knowledge spillovers and 
economic bonding could co-exist, it might be difficult to disentangle each effect separately suggesting that it is 
important to identify conditions under which knowledge spillovers dominates economic bonding. For example, Beck 
et al. (1988) show that the effect of knowledge spillovers is greater if the auditor provides recurring NAS, because 
knowledge resulting from recurring NAS decrease start-up costs associated with an audit, hence reducing the value 
of the incumbency to the auditor (or increasing auditor independence). Despite the theoretical result, empirical 
results continue to be inconsistent. For example, while Kinney et al. (2004) and Gleason and Mills (2007) find 
evidence in support of tax services improving audit quality, Elder et al. (2008) and Paterson and Valencia (2011) find 
that provision of tax services is associated with lower audit quality.  
Son (2005) differentiates “actual” audit quality from “appearance” audit quality by testing possibility that investors' 
perception of audit quality may differ from actual audit quality. Furthermore, he tests impacts of the NAS on audit 
quality by comparing audit quality before and after Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which prohibits auditors from 
providing most NAS to their audit clients. If passage of SOX does indeed improve audit quality, the most noteworthy 
effect should be present for those firms who previously purchased large amounts of NAS. The  empirical results of 
the study fail to find positive effects of NAS, through knowledge spillover, on audit quality, but find the negative 
effects of NAS as measured by both actual and appearance proxies of audit quality. With regard to tests for the 
effectiveness of prohibiting NAS, this study finds a moderate result that changes in financial reporting quality, after 
implementing SOX, vary depending on NAS purchases prior to the Act. However, there seems to be no difference in 
changes of perceived audit quality between firms with large NAS purchases and firms with small NAS purchases.  
On the other hand, the impact of the NAS on audit fees was subject to empirical research. For example Krishnan et 
al. (2005), Hope and Langli (2008), Lim and Tan (2008) and Gul et al. (2010). Krishnan et al. (2005) investigate the 
association between fee-based measures of NAS (non-audit fee ratio, the level of non-audit fees and unexpected non-
audit fees) and earnings response coefficients. Their results indicate negative investor perceptions of NAS, consistent 
with investors perceiving large purchases of NAS as impairing auditor independence. Such negative perceptions do 
not, however, extend to the total fees. 
Hope and Langli (2008) investigate the association between auditor fees, including NAS fees, and the auditors’ 
propensity to issue a modified going concern report using a large sample of private Norwegian firms for the period 
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1997-2002. They find no evidence that auditors compromise their objectivity through fee dependence. In a 
supplementary analysis, they also report that their result sustains using a sample of public companies listed on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) for the period 1997-2005. 
Lim and Tan (2008) posit that the effect of non-audit fees on audit quality is conditional on auditor industry 
specialization in that audit quality is less likely to be impaired in the case of industry specialist auditors providing 
non-audit services. Their premise is that industry specialist auditors are more likely to be concerned about reputation 
losses and litigation exposure, and to benefit from knowledge spillovers from the provision of non-audit services. 
They find some evidence that audit quality (as measured by increased propensity to issue going-concern opinion, 
increased propensity to miss analysts’ forecasts, as well as higher earnings-response coefficients) is less likely to be 
reduced for firms that acquire non-audit services from industry specialist auditors compared to non-specialist 
auditors. Implications are discussed. 
Gul et al. (2010) test whether high non-audit fees affect auditor independence, proxied by auditors’ propensity to 
issue a going concern modified audit opinions. Using U.S. data from 2000 to 2007, they find a non-linear negative 
relationship between non-audit fees and auditors’ propensity to issue going concern audit opinions but this 
relationship only holds when audit tenure is long. Further analysis shows that the link between non-audit fees, long 
tenure and the going concern audit opinion is, however, stronger for low quality auditors (proxied by non-Big 4 and 
industry non-specialist auditors). The findings are robust when controlling for unexpected fees and endogeneity 
among variables. They conclude that high non-audit fees are likely to affect auditor independence only when the 
auditor has a long tenure with the same client or when auditor quality is poor. 
In the light of the above discussion, it can be concluded that most prior research were carried out in developed 
countries. Hence, there is a need to examine the impact of the NAS on audit quality and audit fees in one of the 
emerging economies; Saudi Arabia, therefore, the following hypotheses are formulated:  
H1: Preventing joint NAS and audit services would reduce the audit quality.   
H2: Preventing joint NAS and audit engagement would lead to an increase of audit fees.  
3. Data Analysis and discussion of Findings 
3.1. Sample of the study 
The data used in this study are obtained from a sample of auditors who are practicing in audit firms in Saudi Arabia. 
A total of 220 questionnaires was distributed with a response rate of 27.2%, where 60 questionnaires that are valid 
for the analysis were returned. The questionnaire comprises three sections. Section one contains some demographic 
information; section two includes questions on the impact of the NAS on audit fees, and section three composes 
questions on the impact of the NAS on audit quality.  The questionnaire was revised in the light of a feedback from 
professionals who are working at universities and audit firms. Respondents were asked to express their opinions on 
the effects of the NAS on audit fees and quality using a Liker Scale of five points ranging from 1 “strongly disagree” 
to five “strongly agree”. A test of reliability of measurement using the Cronbach Alpha was carried out to test the 
internal consistency of questions on the second and the third sections of the questionnaire. The result of the tests of 
consistency is 0.731, which is greater than 0.7 indicating acceptable internal consistency of measure of scale 
reliability used in this study (Sekaran, 2000).  
3.2. Demographics 
Analyzing the first section of the questionnaire reveals the demographic background of the respondents, which are 
examined by looking at the following: (1) job title; (2) academic degree; (3) experience; (4) professional 
qualifications; and (5) type of audit firm.  
Figure 1 summarizes the job title of the respondents’ auditors.  Of the 60 auditors analyzed, eight auditors (13%) are 
partners; six auditors (10%) are managers; with the remaining forty-six auditors (67%) who is working as seniors in 
audit firms. 
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Figure 1. The job title of the respondents’ auditors
 
Respondents were requested to report their academic degree. The results r
least a bachelor's degree, where a total of 41 auditors (68.3 percent) have a bachelor's degree, 13 auditors (21.6 
percent) with a master's degree while 6 auditors (10 percent) holding a Doctorate degree. Auditor
of experience which are classified into three categories for the purpose of this research; less than five years, between 
5 to 15 years, and  above 15 years of work experience. The results suggest that a total of 29 auditors (48.3 perc
have less than five years audit work experience, 17 auditors (28.3 percent) with experience between 5 to 15 years 
while 14 auditors (23.4 percent) have above 15 years of work experience.  
Figure 2 shows professional qualifications; 
certificates they earned as Saudi Arabia Certified Public Accountant (SOCPA), Certified Public Accountant (CPA), 
Certified Internal Auditor (CIA), or other. As shown in Figure 2, a
12.9 percent earned CPA, 8 percent holding CIA, and the rest 59.8 per cent have other professional certificates.
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Figure 2. Professional qualifications of the respondents’ auditors
Respondents auditors are affiliated with several audi
working with local audit firms and the remainder (58 percent) are associated with one of the Big
affiliated firms.  
3.3. Auditors’ perceptions on impact of the prohibition of N
The questionnaire was designed to test auditors’ perceptions on the impact of NAS on the audit quality, where 
preventing auditors to provide NAS jointly with audit engagement would let auditors to select NAS as it requires less 
time and efforts and at the same time yields a higher income in comparisons with audit engagement.   In such cases, 
qualified auditors would dismiss the audit market and the majority of audit would be carried out by small audit firms 
will less experience and less qualified and certified auditors, which in turn would affect the audit market and audit 
quality negatively.  
Respondents are requested to express their opinions on seven statements using a Likert
1 “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly agree”.  
“disagree” or “strongly disagree” upon; in the range of 2.1 to 3.0, are “uncertain” and 3.1 or above indicating that the 
respondents either “agree” or “strongly agr
that the average mean ranged from 2.85 to 3.37. The respondents express that p
providing NAS will lead to the failure to be fully acquainted with th
able to specialize in the client’s activity
the external auditor to provide NAS will make it difficult to judge the client’s internal 
affect the auditor’s opinion (statement 5, with a 
an early stage to express their opinions towards the impact of preventing NAS on the audit procedures, where 
are uncertain of the likely impact on the outcome of the audit engagement. 
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Table 1. Impact of NAS on the audit quality  
 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
 ANOVA Test 
 
Mean STD 
 Significant  Level 
Statements Academic 
Degree 
Experience Type 
of  
Audit 
Firm 
1. Preventing the external auditors from providing 
NAS requires the auditor to expand the audit 
scope and exert more effort in it. 
3.19 1.099 .207 .870 .919 
2. Providing NAS by the external auditor will 
motivate him to assign a team with high 
qualifications to perform the audit tasks to this 
client. 
3.37 1.075 .281 .753 .568 
3. Preventing the external auditor from providing 
NAS will lead to the increase in the number of 
work hours and the effort necessary for 
performing the audit. 
3.10 1.044 .298 .112 .667 
4. Preventing the external auditor from providing 
NAS will lead to the failure to be fully 
acquainted with the audit client’s activity and 
consequently less able to specialize in the 
client’s activity. 
2.85 .989 .486 .853 .065 
5. Prohibiting the external auditor of providing 
NAS will make it difficult to judge the client’s 
internal control system and this may affect the 
auditor’s opinion. 
2.94 1.143 .141 .172 .269 
6. Preventing the external auditor from providing 
NAS will lead big audit firms to dismiss the 
audit market; hence small audit firms would 
engage in the audit market and affect the audit 
quality negatively. 
3.30 1.086 .721 .486 .078 
7. Providing NAS by the external auditor will 
reduce the likelihood of issuing a qualified audit 
report. 
3.48 1.170 .431 .723 .457 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
 
Furthermore, the results in table 1 suggest that respondents editors have expressed their opinions on the impact of 
prohibition on the joint provision of the NAS and audit services on audit quality, where the mean value of the rest of 
the statements is exceeding 3.1. The respondents are agreed that preventing the external auditor from providing NAS 
will lead big audit firms to dismiss the audit market, hence small audit firms would engage in the audit  market  and 
impact  the audit quality negatively (mean=3. 3), and providing NAS by the external auditor will reduce the 
likelihood of issuing a qualified audit report (mean=3. 48). The results suggest that a prohibition on the joint 
provision of NAS and audit services would impact the audit quality, where auditors will have relations with the client 
that add much pressure on his opinion, hence this might prevent him from issuing a qualified report on the believe 
that this might lead to losing his client. Accordingly, the first hypotheses is accepted where providing a joint NAS 
and audit services would reduce the audit quality.   
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine whether auditors’ perceptions on the impact of NAS on 
the audit quality were influenced by demographic characteristics. As shown in table 1, it was found that academic 
degree, experience and type of audit firm have no impact on auditors’ perceptions, where all auditors expressed the 
same views on the impact of the NAS on the audit quality (all statements have p > .05).  
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3.4. Auditors’ perceptions on impact of NAS on audit fees  
The questionnaire was designed to test auditors’ perceptions on the impact of the NAS on audit fees. Respondents are 
requested to express their opinions on four statements using a Likert-scale of 5 points ranged from 1 “strongly 
disagree” to 5 “strongly agree”.  This study defines any factors with the mean values up to 2.0, at least “disagree” or 
“strongly disagree” upon; in the range of 2.1 to 3.0, are “uncertain” and 3.1 or above indicating that the respondents 
either “agree” or “strongly agree” that NAS would impact audit fees. The results in table 2 show that the average 
mean ranged from 2.74 to 3.93. The respondents express that providing NAS by the external auditor will lead to a 
reduction in udit fees (mean=2. 74), which indicate that they are uncertain that the NAS would likely would reduce 
the audit fees on the believe that the auditor is familiar with client activities and have access to internal information 
that will reduce the efforts required to conduct the audit process on a timely basis.  
Auditors express that the prohibiting of providing NAS by the external auditor will lead to the absence of any 
allowed discount for providing more than one service at the time (mean=3.24). Furthermore, preventing the external 
auditor from NAS will lead to the decrease in the number of auditors who provide audit services and hence will lead 
to higher audit fees (mean=3.40), where auditors in the market should make the choice between providing audit 
services or NAS, consequently, the audit fees are most likely to be increased in the audit market. Respondents 
express their opinions and agree that NAS yields greater income in comparison with audit services (mean=3.92), this 
might be justified on the ground that NAS requires less time and efforts as auditors may carry out several services 
within a certain period of time that is required to carry out an audit engagement.  The results of table 3 suggest that 
the second hypothesis to be accepted, where preventing joint NAS and audit engagement would lead to an increase 
of audit fees.  
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine whether auditors’ perceptions of the impact of 
NAS on the audit fees was influenced by demographic characteristics.  As shown in table 2, academic degree 
has an impact on auditors’ perceptions, where, Bachelors, Masters, and Doctorate holders have significantly 
different views on only one statement (statement 4 with p < .05). It was found also that experience has a 
significant impact on auditors’ perceptions on some statement related to the impact of the NAS on the audit 
fees  at p < .05 (statements 1 and 2). Furthermore, It was found that type of audit firm has no impact on auditors’ 
perceptions, where all auditors expressed the same views on the impact of the NAS on the audit fees 
 
Table 2. Impact of NAS on the audit fees   
 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
 ANOVA Test 
 
Mean STD 
 Significant  Level 
Statements Academic 
Degree 
Experience Type 
of  
Audit 
Firm 
Providing NAS by the external auditor will lead 
to a reduction in audit fees. 
2.74 1.159 .805 .049* .564 
Preventing the external auditor from NAS will 
lead to the decrease in the number of auditors 
who provide audit services and hence will 
lead to higher audit fees. 
3.40 0.896 .367 .027* .263 
NAS yields greater income in comparison with 
audit services. 
    3.92 1.038 .293 .981 .481 
Prohibiting providing NAS by the external 
auditor will lead to the absence of any 
allowed discount for providing more than 
one service at the time.  
3.24 1.051 .022* .947 .926 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
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4. Conclusion and Directions for Further Research   
This study investigates whether the prohibition of NAS in Saudi Arabia would affect the Audit quality and audit fees.  
The small number of prior studies carried out in emerging markets especially the Saudi Arabia motivates this study. 
Based on a survey questionnaire for a sample of auditors who are working at Big-4 and Non-Big4 audit firms, the 
results suggest that auditors are able to define the impact of the prohibition of the NAS on audit quality and audit 
fees. Article No. 5 of the SOCPA has affected the profession significantly. It is expected that active audit firms in 
Saudi Arabia are trying to find a way to violate such prohibition, for example, audit firms might switch clients among 
them. Alternatively, the audit firm will choose to provide NAS and dismiss the audit engagements, where NAS 
requires shorter times and less effort, at the same time, they gained more income. If this choice widespread among 
audit firms, the audit processes would be carried out by smaller firms with limited audit quality. Otherwise, big audit 
firms, who prefer to be specialized in the audit process with high quality, would ask for high fees. However, the 
empirical results suggest that preventing joint NAS and audit services will lead to the decrease in the number of 
auditors who provide audit services and hence audit fees would increase. Furthermore, the NAS would affect the 
audit quality. Demographics of respondents’ auditors as auditors’ academic degree and experience have influenced 
the auditors’ perceptions but the type of audit firm has no impact on auditors’ perceptions, where all auditors 
expressed the same views on the impact of the NAS on the audit fees and the audit quality.  The main lessons driven 
from this study is that the SOCPA should give attention to Article NO.5, where such prohibition of NAS in Saudi 
Arabia does not exist across many countries as the US, the UK, Canada, Australia, or other GCC as  Kuwait, United 
Arab Emirates and Qatar, which have a similar economies, political and cultural environment.  
However, the findings of this study contribute to the literature of the impact of NAS in emerging economies, where it 
covers a new ground and provide some thought that might act as a vehicle to develop Article No. 5 of SOCPA and 
help policy setters to maintain good rules that guarantee better quality of audit services and non-audit services at a 
fair fee and maintain audit independence.  
Further research is required to examine the impact of Article No. 5 on the audit profession with emphasis on client 
firms, to see the consequences of this prohibition on: (i) the audit fees, (ii) the audit quality, (iii) and the auditor 
independence. Consideration of industry type and audit specialization would enrich the outcomes of this line of 
research and pave the way for the development of the audit profession in Saudi Arabia.  
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